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Abstract 
Japan is one of the biggest economies in the world, and its huge market gives 
companies a strong incentive to establish themselves within the country. This study 
was conducted to identify how Swedish companies have managed their establishment 
within Japan. The purpose was to study six Swedish companies which have 
subsidiaries in Japan, and the methods they used for establishing their company, 
including how the management of the subsidiary was conducted and an analysis of the 
difficulties the companies faced. A qualitative method was employed through 
interviews and questionnaires. The collected data was then analyzed by utilizing the 
Uppsala Model, Hofstede's Cultural Dimensions and the EPRG-model, amongst many 
others. Results indicate that the companies have used a wide variety of different 
establishment methods, and that they have faced problems due to cultural differences. 
The study also reveals that the companies had needed to adapt their managerial 
approach to Japan, although not to the extent expected from reviewing theories and 
earlier literature. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1	  Problem	  background	  
Today, Japan is the world's third largest economy (CNN, 2012) and should therefore 
be a market in which foreign and Swedish companies feel strong incentives to 
establish themselves in. The presence of Swedish companies is however far lower 
than might be expected. By looking at the Swedish investment into Japan and South 
Korea, both are almost on the same level even though South Korea is a considerably 
smaller economy (IMF, 2012; World Bank, 2010ab). One of the reasons for this can 
be directed towards the lack of proper information on how to conduct business in 
Japan for Swedish companies. This lack of information has been experienced first 
hand by one of the case companies in this study, as almost two years of research was 
dedicated with the purpose of understanding the Japanese market. Despite this, 
mistakes were still made by the company. This is a good example of the existing need 
for research that combines proper empirical findings with theories, in order to provide 
a better understanding of the problem area. 
 
Even though Japan is such a huge economy the inward foreign direct investment 
(FDI) to Japan has been far lower than that to other large economies. Looking at the 
numbers presented by Paprzycki & Fukao (2008, p 75) for global inward FDI flows 
between the years 2001-2005 it clearly shows that Japan is lagging behind other 
countries. During these years Japan received a 0.9% share of the global inward FDI 
compared with 14% for the United States of America, and 7.9% for China. 
Historically Japan has not had a high focus on attracting inward FDI but during an 
economic crisis in the 1990s, Japan started to make serious efforts to attract FDI and 
managed to get an upswing in inward FDI (ibid.). This economic crisis was due to the 
fact that the previously strong national industries and companies had lost its 
momentum as the bubble in the Japanese economy burst in early the 1990s and 
therefore the country felt an increasing need of inward FDI to keep the economy 
rolling (Kingston, 2011). 
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As mentioned earlier the Swedish investments into Japan are relatively low and have 
been so historically. The numbers for Swedish FDI to Japan first appeared in the 
figures of 1995, and the numbers grew until a severe drop after the 2008 global 
economic crisis (JETRO, 2012). Japan’s economy showed the strongest recovery after 
the crisis amongst the countries in G7. However, this economic recovery was halted 
due to the earthquake/tsunami disaster of 2011(Economy Watch Content Team, 
2010). Despite this huge setback, Japan’s economy should recover once again in the 
coming years (Tabuchi, 2011). As such Swedish companies should feel strong 
incentives to become established in the market, and companies should now be looking 
into the prospect of establishing themselves in Japan. 
1.2	  Problem	  
It is necessary to see how Swedish companies have acted in the Japanese market 
successfully, both regarding establishment and management of the subsidiaries. This 
includes how the companies handled their establishment by considering the nuances 
of the Japanese market and how they tackled these obstacles in an efficient manner. 
Concerning the management of the Japanese subsidiaries there is a need to know how 
other companies have managed its subsidiaries to see how these adjusted to the way 
of conducting business in Japan. The need for sharing knowledge between companies 
is also pointed out by Johanson & Vahlne (2009), who state that other companies’ 
knowledge and experiences are a foundation that creates easier access to a market. 
 
One aspect that will always be present when talking about a MNC’s actions abroad is 
the existence of cultural differences. By utilizing Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
(1984) framework, we would be able to see clear differences between Swedish and 
Japanese culture by comparing the countries respective scores. Even though this 
framework is old, it is still frequently employed and proves a good framework to this 
day, although the scores might not be as precise as at the time of publication. Will the 
cultural differences be the main cause of the problems that the companies have faced? 
If so, will it be possible to relate these problems to the differences between the 
countries scores in the different dimensions or is the framework outdated in Japan? 
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By using Johanson & Vahlne's (1977) well-established theoretical framework of the 
establishment process we will be able to categorize how the different companies have 
handled their establishment process in Japan. We will also examine Johanson & 
Vahlne’s (2009) claim that today’s business environment is viewed as a web of 
relationships and networks. If relations are of increasing importance as opposed to in 
the past when the market was more neoclassical with independent suppliers and 
customers. As such, the main question that we aim to answer regarding the 
establishment process is: What aspects in the entry process were of particular 
consideration for Swedish companies when entering the Japanese market? 
 
Approaches to managing foreign subsidiaries are described by the four different 
strategies presented in Heenan & Perlmutter’s (1977) EPRG model. As this model 
shows the general movement of subsidiary management and describes the different 
stages in a good way it is highly applicable for this thesis. Which strategies Swedish 
companies in Japan utilize for HR management, product strategies and CSR/Risk 
management needs to be thoroughly scrutinized to produce an overall understanding 
of the subsidiary management conducted by Swedish companies in Japan. This in 
order to see whether these are efficient and if there is a development towards other 
strategies. All companies have different structures, different products and are of 
different size, which means that they all have different needs. We aim to answer the 
question: How do the Swedish companies structure their subsidiary management in 
order to adjust to the Japanese market? 
 
For future use of this study and to see whether Japan is a market that will be attractive 
in the future it is important to not only scrutinize what has been but also what is 
expected of the Japanese market in the future by those with knowledge of its 
intricacies. Through this information we will aim at drawing conclusions regarding 
how well the previously mentioned theories reflect the reality of conducting business 
in Japan. The main question that we aim at answering regarding the future is: How 
will the Japanese market develop and what will happen in regards to the establishment 
process and management strategies? 
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In summary, the thesis’ core questions are: 
 
What aspects in the entry process were of particular consideration for Swedish 
companies when entering the Japanese market? 
 
How do the Swedish companies structure their subsidiary management in order to 
adjust to the Japanese market? 
 
How will the Japanese market develop in the future and what will happen in regards 
to the establishment process and management strategies? 
1.3	  Purpose	  
The purpose of this thesis is to provide the reader with a thorough understanding of 
the unique challenges that the Japanese market poses in terms of subsidiary 
establishment and management for Swedish companies. This thesis aims at providing 
helpful information on how other companies faced these challenges in both, positive 
and negative ways. 
 
Concerning the theoretical framework there is a need to fill the knowledge gap that 
exists for Swedish companies looking to enter the Japanese market and also for the 
development of subsidiary management. By collecting and analyzing empirical 
findings we aim to fill this gap in theory, as it has not previously been applied in this 
context. This information will be of practical value for companies who plan an entry 
into the Japanese market and those currently in the market. 
1.4	  Disposition	  of	  the	  thesis	  
 
The first chapter of the thesis consists of the problem backround as well as the 
problem definition. In the second chapter we present the theories that will be utilized. 
Chapter three covers the methods used to construct this thesis. In chapter four the 
interviews will be presented. In chapter five we analyse the information received from 
the interviews. In chapter six we conclude our findings and aswer our core questions. 	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2. Theoretical Framework 
Regarding the theoretical framework, we have worked with different theories in 
regards to both the subsidiary establishment process and subsidiary management, our 
two core points in this thesis. 
2.1	  Cultural	  dimensions	  
In Hofstede's (1984) research he argues that culture is a state of mind, which children 
inherit from their parents, students from their teachers and from leaders to their 
followers. In the same book it is was argued that a country’s culture resides within its 
inhabitants and in turn impacts upon the company culture within a nation. 
 
We present the cultural dimensions of Hofstede (1984) as the first of our theories 
since the cultural aspect has an affect on both establishment and management. 
 
Hofstede (1984) identified four variables in order to define the culture within a 
country. The different variables are; power distance, individualism, masculinity and 
uncertainty avoidance. Later, Hofstede & Bond (1984, 1988) introduced a fifth 
dimension based on the Confucian values in Chinese society. This dimension was 
later named long-term orientation (Hofstede, 2001). A sixth dimension has also been 
added by Hofstede & Minkov (2010) called Indulgence versus Restraint but as this is 
not relevant for this thesis it will not be covered. 
 
Hofstede (1984) defines the different dimensions as the following; 
Power distance, the first dimension, refers to the different levels of power that exist 
between leaders and followers. In societies with high power distance, hierarchy is of 
great importance. It is accepted that power is unevenly distributed. 
 
Individualism, the second dimension, refers to how people identify themselves within 
groups. People with high individualistic values mainly care about themselves, their 
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accomplishments and career progress as opposed to mainly caring about the group’s 
benefits and interests. 
 
Masculinity, the third dimension, refers to the fact that in a masculine society success, 
heroism and material success is acceptable. It is socially acceptable to show to others 
that you are successful. In a feminine society however, the norm is rather to have a 
good quality of life, good personal relations and to take care of the weak. 
 
Uncertainty avoidance, the fourth dimension, refers to the fact that societies with high 
uncertainty avoidance usually have a quite strict approach to what is acceptable and 
what is not. As a result, they are more intolerant to new ideas and they are more 
narrow minded in their opinions. They usually attempt to control the future rather 
than accepting the natural course of events. 
 
The fifth dimension, named long-term orientation by Hofstede & Bond (1984, 1988), 
refers to the fact that in a society with a high long-term orientation mindset, people 
generally plan more long-term. It is acceptable for more time to pass before seeing 
results on an investment and it is also important to keep long-term relations with other 
people and companies. In the case of a low long-term orientation score, people are 
more inclined to be impatient, wanting faster results on investments and moving at a 
faster pace. 
 
In Figure 1, we see the comparison between Sweden and Japan’s respective scores. 
Figure 1. 
 
Source: Hofstede, 2012. 
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It is important to be aware that the data collected for Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
framework was done before 1984. Concerning possible change in these dimensions 
for a culture Woodring (1995) showed that Japanese students have higher 
individuality and lower power distance than the older generations. A difference in 
culture should be made aware of and evaluated, so that predictions for the future can 
be made. For this study it can mean new challenges and/or opportunities as the 
students from this study now are now grasping positions of influence in Japanese 
society and business. This will in turn affect the development of how management in 
Japan is conducted and the strategies for reaching the best results. 
 
Another quite unique aspect of the Japanese culture is the homogeneity that exists in 
the country. Some would argue that Japan is not as homogenous as it was before. 
While this may be true, the myth of homogeneity is still believed in and as such it is 
still an important cultural concept. This is discussed by Jandt (2003), as he writes that 
the Japanese have a way of communicating with each other without a language. This 
is due to the fact that most people in Japan share the same fundamental ideas about 
certain things and as such they are able to understand each other with few words 
spoken. 
 
For this thesis it is important to be able to see if the companies included in our thesis’ 
main difficulties of the Japanese market can be attributed to the amount of cultural 
differences that exist between Sweden and Japan. Johanson & Vahlne (1977) argue 
that the amount of physical distance between markets has an incremental role, in that 
when a company enters a new market, the firms would enter markets with 
successively increasing physical distance. The concept of physical distance is defined 
as factors that disrupt the flow of information between the firm and the market such 
as, differences in culture, language and political systems. Since all of these factors 
differ greatly between Sweden and Japan there is a need to understand why these 
difficulties have occurred and to do this Hofstede’s cultural dimensions will serve as a 
base for this understanding.    
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2.2	  The	  internationalization	  process	  
The Uppsala model was developed in the seventies by two Swedish professors at 
Uppsala University. They observed the behavior of Swedish manufacturing 
companies during their internationalization process and from this experience they 
created their model. The model consists of four steps that a company usually takes as 
part of their establishment chain (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), where every step 
represents a higher grade of internationalization and commitment to the foreign 
market. 
 
1.  Sporadic export activities 
2.  Export via independent representative. 
3.  Establishment of a foreign sales representative. 
4.  Foreign production/manufacturing 
 
The model also shows that companies prefer to first enter markets with a smaller 
psychic distance. Establishment becomes harder when there is less information about 
a potential market (ibid.). According to Whitelock (2002) companies expand their 
internationalization over time based on the rate of their knowledge development, 
which in turn leads to a lessening of the physical distance. In the same research 
Whitelock also makes it clear that the most important knowledge to be gained is the 
knowledge that comes from personal experience.   
 
Johanson & Vahlne (2009) argue that in today’s business environment networks are 
of the utmost importance to companies, as opposed to a more neoclassical market 
with independent suppliers and customers. Today outsidership is the main cause of 
uncertainty as opposed to physical distance. All companies are involved in different 
business networks, which are connected to each other, often in complex ways. In the 
updated model a new concept of outsider/insidership has been developed to highlight 
how knowledge gained from relationships in business networks is extremely 
important for firms’ successful internationalization. Johanson & Vahlne describe an 
insider as a firm that is well established within such networks and an outsider ias a 
firm that has not established such networks (ibid.).                
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The disadvantages that come from being classed as an outsider are pointed out by 
Froese & Goeritz (2006). In their case German managers had troubles with 
implementing changes since they were seen as outsiders by their Japanese co-workers 
thus failing in Japan. However, when accepted as a leader and an insider it is much 
easier to implement changes. Based on this an assumption can be made that Japan is a 
market where insidership is a necessary factor to succeed and will play an important 
role for the foreign companies in Japan. 
 
Johanson & Vahlne (2009) describe the actors as carriers of knowledge, commitment, 
network relations and trust. Learning happens when the companies share their own 
knowledge with each other. The ability to identify opportunities that are created 
through networks is a deciding factor for which markets the company chooses to 
enter. 
 
Critique against the model shows that it is not always applicable in reality. The 
internationalization process does not always follow the steps proposed in the Uppsala 
model when companies need to adapt to current situations in the markets that they 
enter. Hedelund & Kverneland (1984) say that this can be explained by the ever-
changing strategies that competition utilizes as well as other changes. It is no longer 
the amount of physical distance that is the deciding factor for a company’s 
internationalization since the physical distance between markets is becoming 
gradually smaller. Markets are becoming increasingly homogenous due to the fact 
that information is becoming more and more accessible. 
 
As such it will be interesting to see if this will stand true from the experiences that the 
companies in this thesis have had. If the exponentially increased amount of 
information that now exist around markets has lessened the physical distance between 
Sweden and Japan, it will no longer be seen as an obstacle in the sense that it once 
was. 
 
Johanson & Vahlne (1990) also realized that there are exceptions to the gradual 
increase of commitment from a company that aims to become more and more 
international. First, when an already large company with good finances goes through 
the internationalization process they sometimes skip some steps because they can take 
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more risks than a smaller company. Second, when a market is stable there are other 
ways to gain market knowledge rather than getting hands-on experience from being in 
the market. Third, when the company has knowledge and experience from similar 
markets they can use this knowledge by generalizing when entering a new specific 
market. 
 
With the critique against the model and the exceptions for the gradual increase of a 
company’s commitment taken into consideration we assume that we will see 
significant differences in how companies in this thesis handled their establishment in 
Japan. 
2.3	  Managerial	  decisions	  in	  Japan	  
When covering the theoretical approach of management in this thesis we will to a 
high degree focus on the EPRG model developed by Heenan & Perlmutter (1979). 
With this model as a basis for the theoretical framework of management we will be 
able to categorize the companies in our thesis’ approaches to different managerial 
decisions and through this see what parts of acting in Japan demands extra attention. 
The parts we will focus on are: HR management, Product strategies and CSR/Risk 
management. 
 
In the EPRG-model there are four strategies, and these are: Ethnocentric, Polycentric, 
Region-centric and Geocentric. When this model was first created it did not include 
the region-centric approach, but as this was later used to a higher extent and the 
positive and negative aspects of it could be analyzed properly it was added.  Before 
describing the four different strategies it is important to note that a company can, and 
often does, show characteristics of different strategies as different functions within the 
company are managed in different ways (ibid.). This is why a division of the 
companies’ managerial decisions is needed when using this model. 
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The characteristics of the four strategies presented in this research of Heenan & 
Perlmutters (1979) are: 
Ethnocentric 
Heenan & Perlmutter (1979) describe this as a strategy where the company will stick 
firmly to its own practices and see to it that its subsidiaries are well integrated into the 
headquarters and company as a whole. This creates a unified company and makes it 
easier to transfer knowledge and competence within the company, which can speed up 
many different processes. The disadvantages argued for this strategy are poor 
adaptation to the foreign markets and loss of local knowledge, which may hurt the 
company in the long term. 
Polycentric 
When a high focus on the local knowledge and culture is prioritized due to the 
superiority of reaching the market in the right way the polycentric strategy, described 
by Heenan & Perlmutter (1979), is used. The decision-making is moved from the HQ 
to the local subsidiary. This is argued as a good approach in markets and countries 
where the culture and the market preferences vary greatly from that of the home 
market. However, it is also argued that using this strategy means losing the integration 
advantages of the ethnocentric strategy, as it can also be difficult to maintain a united 
company culture and to share core competence within the company. 
Region-centric 
The region-centric strategy of Heenan & Perlmutter (1979) depicts a strategy where 
companies choose to group the countries and markets into regions. This aims to 
provide a higher local responsiveness than that of the ethnocentric approach and a 
higher integration within the company than polycentric does. This provides the 
advantages from both ethnocentric and polycentric, whilst keeping the disadvantages 
minimal. 
Geocentric 
The last strategy observed and described by Heenan & Perlmutter (1979) is the 
geocentric in which management of the company is conducted as a pure global 
company with no ties to a specific home market or country. The focus of a geocentric 
strategy lies in having competent global managers that are able to solve the 
company’s problem wherever in the world these may appear. This creates a good and 
well-connected company culture with good synergies for information flow. A 
geocentric strategy tries to balance the global integration and the local responsiveness 
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for all the different advantages it is able to reach and to minimize the disadvantages. 
These advantages and disadvantages will not be as clear as in the ethnocentric or the 
polycentric strategies but they will be present. 
 
Most MNCs evolve from ethnocentrism to polycentrism and finally to geocentrism 
(ibid.). There can however be many routes that a company might take. It may be that 
the new internationally focused CEO will try to take a company straight from 
ethnocentrism to geocentrism (ibid.). The opposite may also occur when that CEO 
retires, and as a result the company will move back to its previous ways (ibid.). 
 
The HR activities will probably have a higher influence from HQ if the companies 
feel that the HR management culture is alike between the countries, and in this case 
an ethnocentric strategy would suffice. However, if the differences are high in HR 
between Sweden and Japan as the cultural differences displayed in Hofstede’s (1984) 
research showed that more of a polycentric approach would probably be more 
feasible. However, Hofstede (1983) showed that American companies entering Japan 
were able to utilize, though slightly modified, American management theories with 
great success even though the cultural differences here were vast. This means that 
either Japanese people have styles that are easier to adapt to other management styles 
or that these two cultures and management styles somehow fit together better than 
Hofstede’s (1984) numbers suggest. This can also be attributed to the fact that foreign 
subsidiaries in Japan enjoy a greater freedom in HR management since they are not 
expected to follow all the unwritten rules that exist in Japan (Dolles & Takahashi, 
2011) 
 
For all companies acting outside its home market the companies will both create and 
fall under the reputation that the home market has. As explained by Bilkey & 
Nes  (1982) in their assessment of the impact of a product's country of origin and the 
associations that might come with a certain place of origin. Different countries have 
different attraction in different market sectors and countries but overall low developed 
countries seem to have less attraction than developed countries. We therefore assume 
for this research that the kind of attraction that Sweden has in Japan will be a crucial 
part to whether the Swedish companies will need to adapt its products to the Japanese 
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market with a polycentric strategy, or whether the attraction of “Swedishness” is too 
high, in which case the ethnocentric approach might be more feasible. 
 
The risk management and CSR activities conducted by the Swedish companies in 
Japan will be affected by the situation and general culture for this in Japan. From an 
assertion of this the companies that feel that these have much to gain from being 
active with these kinds of activities in Japan will be more active than the others 
(Robins, 2005). If the business practices in Japan have much to gain from these 
activities, or high losses if not conducted, there will most likely be a polycentric 
approach. As Tokoro (2007) describes partly in his article, the Non Profitable 
Organizations in Japan are weak and thereby a high-pressure for local activities does 
not exist. This would mean that an overall geocentric approach would suffice in 
Japan. 
 
3. Methodology 
This chapter will outline and justify our choice of method and the approach of our 
study. We clarify how we acquired our empirical data and we discuss the validity and 
reliability of our research. 
3.1	  Research	  Approach	  
In this thesis, we used qualitative research in order to understand the situation. We 
conducted a small amount of interviews as opposed to a completely survey based 
information gathering procedure (Patel & Davidsson, 2003). In-depth interviews with 
people who have had experience with the Japanese market were conducted, some via 
mail questionnaires and some via personal interviews. The questionnaires consist of 
open questions thus encouraging the respondent to elaborate, these were sent out 
when an oral interview wasn’t possible. The purpose was to obtain a deeper 
understanding of why and how Swedish companies entered the Japanese market and 
what management of these subsidiaries looks like. 
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The main purpose of a study based on empirical research is to combine existing 
theories and earlier literature with the collected empirical knowledge. We used a 
deductive research approach to connect our theoretical and empirical knowledge. 
Deductive reasoning works from the more general to the more specific. The process 
starts with a development of a theoretical framework for the topic of interest, which is 
then narrowed down to a hypothesis that can be tested. This leads to being able to test 
the hypotheses against collected data and in the end there is a confirmation or 
contradiction of the original theories (Gill & Johnson, 2010; Trochim & Donnelly, 
2006). 
 
In our case this meant that our research process began with us deciding upon what 
subject to write about. Through observation of the Japanese market and its 
inconsistencies we found a clear lack of information regarding Swedish company’s 
entry and management activities in the market, this is how we found our topic of 
interest. Then we searched for and chose theories that we believed would work well 
with explaining the subject. From this we developed our core questions based on the 
theories chosen. From our core questions and theories we designed the interview 
questions that was utilized for our data gathering. Following this we analyzed the 
information gathered from the interviews (our empiric data), which formed our 
conclusion. In other words, we followed the “top-down” approach associated with the 
deductive research approach.	  
3.2	  Investigation	  Method	  
The primary data collected in this thesis consists of information from interviews that 
we have conducted, face-to-face, via Skype and also via e-mails. We chose to use 
these methods in order to get as much qualitative data as possible and due to some 
companies not being able to participate in oral interviews. The interviews were 
recorded and transcribed, with the data analyzed and the most relevant data presented 
as a qualified selection of the answers (Olsson & Sörensen, 2011). We conducted 
interviews in different ways depending on how much time the companies were 
willing to spend on sharing their information with us. The interviews conducted have 
all been less than an hour for the simple reason of making it easier for the 
interviewees to fit it into their schedule. We wanted to do as many oral interviews as 
possible since we felt that these types of interviews provide more in depth knowledge 
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about the subjects since it is much easier to elaborate on answers when you have a 
verbal dialogue rather than communication via e-mails. 
 
We based our interviews on our questionnaire. However, we did not follow the 
questionnaire fully during our face-to-face and Skype interviews. We chose to utilize 
a semi-structured approach during our interviews. According to Björklund & Paulsson 
(2003) this leaves room for more spontaneity, which in turn can lead to expansions of 
the topic. This can be in terms of discussion giving complementing information that 
can lead to important points of knowledge that would otherwise be omitted (ibid.). It 
also enables us to gain a deeper understanding of what the interviewees think and 
allows them the possibility of describing the topics at hand with their own words. 
 
The two companies that only answered us via the questionnaires preferred to share 
their knowledge to us in that way. The information we received from the two 
companies was comprehensive and as such we chose to include them in the thesis. 
 
We were both present for all of the interviews in order to avoid communication 
problems while also making the interviews easier to conduct. We also worked 
together on analyzing the information that could be extracted from the e-mails. The 
interviews were recorded for convenience and the need to clarify what participants 
had said. The interviews were conducted in Swedish. 
 
The amount of information that we received from the companies differed, both due to 
the different ways that we interviewed them and also due to the companies having 
different amounts of knowledge to share. We have been selective in the sense that we 
present the information, which we believe to be the most important and relevant to 
our thesis, and due to this some imbalance between the companies is present. 
3.3	  Course	  of	  action	  
This thesis aims to show how Swedish companies have handled their entry into Japan 
and how they subsequently handled the management of their Japanese subsidiaries. 
We asked them questions about how their establishment process was handled, how 
they attracted Japanese employees, how they manage their Japanese subsidiaries and 
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about the intricacies of the Japanese market. Through these questions we could 
discover answers to the following:  did the companies follow the establishment 
processes that the theory suggest they should and did they put a lot of effort into 
becoming an insider in the market? Do they adapt new management styles in Japan or 
use the same type of management as they do in Sweden and what makes the Japanese 
market unique? The companies in this study entered the Japanese market during 
different times. They range from 1905 to 2011; this gives us knowledge regarding 
how the processes of establishment and management of companies have changed over 
time. 
 
We chose our theories based on their relevance to the questions we wanted answers 
to.  The theories used in this thesis are found through searches in various databases 
and also through our pre-knowledge about the subject from previous studies and visits 
to Japan. We also conducted searches at different databases, such as the one found at 
the Economic Library in Gothenburg, using keywords such as “establishment” and 
“management” in order to find relevant articles regarding our topic. From this 
information we created the questionnaire that was sent out to the different companies. 
The questionnaire was also used as a base when we conducted our interviews. 
 
We utilized a direct qualitative content analysis approach, which entails the use of 
relevant theoretical framework as a guideline so that relevant conclusions can be 
drawn (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The data was collected during interviews with both 
open ended and direct questions. Since the goal was to identify what parts of the 
theories that seemed to be true, we recorded all of them in order so that we could 
highlight what parts that correlated well with the reality that our interviewees have 
experienced in Japan. The data that was received from the interviews were evaluated 
with a basis in our theories. We took different parts of the different theories into 
consideration when we categorized the different companies. Due to this process we 
were able to get a better overview on how the different companies acted regarding 
their approaches to management and their establishment. 
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3.4	  Selection	  of	  companies	  
The companies included in this thesis have been selected because they are Swedish 
companies with subsidiaries in Japan. We got in contact with most of the companies 
through the help of the Swedish Trade Council in Japan; from them we acquired a list 
of all the Swedish companies currently active in Japan. With this information we 
searched the companies’ websites to find their contact information. We ended up 
sending out emails to around sixty-five companies, of which six companies replied. In 
addition to this we also managed to contact two other companies through personal 
connections, making a total of eight companies that answered our questions. Out of 
these eight we chose to include six companies in this thesis. The reasons for excluding 
two companies were the fact that one of them was not suitable because we did not 
receive enough relevant information from them to justify the inclusion of the 
company into our research. The other company sent their answers to our questionnaire 
to us too late, and as such we had to exclude that company due to time constraints. 
 
We decided to not exclude any company due to size, type or location of the company 
in Japan when choosing which companies to contact. We wanted to obtain 
information from a broad spectrum of different companies in order to understand our 
topic as good as possible. 	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Sample characteristics 
	  
Table	  1.	  
Company Sector 
Year of Japanese 
market entry 
Size 
(employees globally) 
Astra Tech Dental implants / Medical 
devices 
1996 2 200 
IKEA Furniture 2006(1976*) 127 000 
Sandvik Tools / 
Materials Technology / 
Mining and Construction 
1961 50 000 
Syncron Supply Chain 
Management 
2008 110 
Vitrolife Fertility/ 
Transplantation/ Stem Cell 
Cultivation 
2000 220 
Wallenius Wilhelmsen 
Logistics (WWL) 
Logistics 1961/1970s** 3 500 
	  
3.5	  Reliability	  &	  Validity	  
When conducting scientific research there is a need to see how strong the reliability 
and validity of the research is (Svenning, 2000). Validity in this case would be how 
good the connection was between our theory and our empirical evidence. We built our 
questionnaire questions so that these would make it possible for us to answer our core 
question and to fulfill our purpose. The people we have interviewed have all have 
high knowledge about their respective company’s operations in Japan. 
 
From the information we received from the companies we are able to generalize about 
how the situation in Japan is for Swedish companies. Our purpose is to understand the 
difficulties and opportunities that a Swedish company faces during their establishment 
*IKEA	  reached	  Japan	  in	  1976	  but	  exit	  to	  later	  re-­‐enter	  in	  2006	  	  **At	  the	  time	  of	  entry	  WWL	  were	  two	  separate	  companies	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process and what aspects of the management of Swedish subsidiaries need extra 
consideration. From our interviews we are able to draw conclusions from the 
interviewees’ own experiences. The fact that we interviewed different types of 
companies’ gives us the advantage of producing a general feel for the situation in 
Japan. From this, we believe that our validity is high enough that it is feasible for us 
to draw some general conclusions. Our validity could have been even higher if we had 
included more companies in our research. 
 
The meaning of reliability is how trustworthy the collected data is (ibid.). How 
reliable our work is basically comes down to how reliable our collected information 
is. If another study was to be done with the same sources as we have, and if it were to 
draw the same conclusions as our study, then this would be considered a highly 
reliable thesis (ibid.). The time that the companies in this study started working with 
Japan range from the early twentieth century up until only a few years ago. Our 
questions are adapted to our purpose and if they were to be used again in order to do a 
thesis with a similar approach the probability that they would show similar results is 
high. To avoid low reliability we used questions that were as short and precise as 
possible (ibid.). The information received about the companies’ experiences during 
establishment should remain the same since it is something that has already happened. 
However, the questions regarding the companies’ prospect for the future may change. 
In other words, if our study were to be done again at a later time the answers 
regarding their current positive and negative aspects of doing business in Japan could 
very well change. The fact that no companies have decided to stay anonymous also 
strengthens the reliability of our essay since a reader could easily check the facts 
about a company. 
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4. Empirical findings 
In this section we will provide the data that we have collected during our interviews. 
We present the information from all of the six companies in alphabetical order. 
4.1	  Astra	  Tech	  
Astra Tech is a Swedish company that develops and manufactures dental implants and 
medical devices in the fields of urology and surgery. The company was founded in 
1948 and has subsidiaries in 16 markets. The person we interviewed at the company is 
Peter Selley, the CEO who is about to retire from this position. He has been very 
involved in the company’s activities in Japan and while he has not lived in the country 
he has been there on numerous occasions and knows the country well. We spoke to 
him at Astra Tech’s headquarters in Mölndal, Sweden.  
4.1.1 Establishment 
Astra Tech started looking more and more into a possible establishment in Japan 
during the 90’s. As Astra Tech were getting well known within their industry a 
Japanese company initiated contact. Astra Tech did not enter the market right away 
and kept the Japanese company on hold while they started to research the possibilities 
of entering Japan.  
 
1996 they entered the market by striking a deal with the Japanese distributor and at 
the same time started up their own service center in the country. This center worked 
as an intermediary between the customers in Japan and the HQ in Sweden. The reason 
for the entry was that they felt that the product line would work very well at the 
Japanese market. 
 
They didn't face any unexpected problems in this phase. Mostly since they had a 
Japanese partner but also due to the fact that proper research had been done prior to 
entering the market. The whole establishing process took a couple of years from when 
the Japanese company started talking to them until the products were approved for the 
market in 1996.  
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One of the main difficulties they faced when entering the market was the bureaucracy 
in the market. There is such a high demand on quality that their normal standards 
were not enough. As such there were a lot of extra work involved, as they needed to 
get their products approved by different agencies. This combined with the huge 
amount of paperwork made the process of getting their products approved much 
harder than usual. An example of how hard it is to get things approved is how they 
just recently got one of their updated versions of an old product approved.  
 
“We had to sell an outdated product for 7 years just because the new version didn’t 
get approved.” 
Peter Selley, CEO Astra Tech, interview 
 
They didn't face any huge problems when they needed to hire people. Once again this 
was mainly due to their connection with their Japanese distributor. Without that 
connection Peter Selley believes that they would have had a hard time finding good 
people to hire.  
4.1.2 Management 
Their Japanese subsidiary is run in basically the same way as the companies other 
subsidiaries around the world. While they need some extra help in some areas they are 
also better at other areas than other subsidiaries so in the end Peter Selley does not 
believe there to be any major differences.  
 
They only have one Swedish person working in Japan and he was recruited locally, he 
did not have any prior experience working at the company in Sweden. He is currently 
the CFO in Japan. The management of their Japanese employees is totally run by the 
Japanese subsidiary. 
 
According to Peter Selley the cultural differences between Sweden and Japan have 
not been a big problem. As long as you understand how the Japanese work and work 
with them rather than against them there are no big problems. They do things 
differently in Japan, but if you let them go through their process things usually work 
out very well in the end. At meetings Peter Selley feels that there is a lot more 
discussions that goes on without anything actually being decided. This feels unnatural 
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as a Swede since we are used to decisions being made in meetings. But in the end 
things just gets done and everyone seems to know what they are supposed to do and 
everyone is moving in the same direction. Peter Selley also feels that his presence 
alone, as the CEO, is really important regardless how much input he can give on a 
specific topic. It usually brings things along more smoothly. In this regard Peter 
Selley feel that when managing in Japan authority can be of great importance. 
 
They hold the meetings in English but the Japanese participants usually talk with each 
other in Japanese when they are discussing something. There is still a language barrier 
but it does not pose any big problems. Peter Selley also feels that his experience from 
being in Japan over fifty times helps him since he can feel in what direction their 
discussion is going even though he can’t understand Japanese. 
 
Under the previous ownership of Astra Zenica the Astra group organized so that every 
employee at the company would spend one day of every year helping the community. 
Doing everything from helping out with cutting down forest too going out to clinics to 
help out. This was done in order to establish good relationships between the 
subsidiaries and society and gave the group a lot of positive publicity. At the moment 
however Astra Tech do not conduct any similar activities. 
 
One thing that Peter Selley thinks is unique about managing a subsidiary in Japan is 
the Japanese dedication to their jobs and how they handle catastrophic situations such 
as the tsunami and earthquake in 2011. 
 
“We barely had any employees who were absent from work. People walked long 
distances when the trains weren’t running and kept working. Quite amazing.” 
Peter Selley, CEO Astra Tech, interview 
 
Whereas in Sweden this might not have happened and that this was despite the fact 
that management had encouraged the employees to take time off if they felt that they 
needed it. 
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4.1.3 Consideration of the Japanese market and its development 
According to Peter Selley the positive sides of the Japanese market is the fact that it is 
a very quality oriented market with reasonable demands that suits Astra Tech well. 
The largest negative aspect is the bureaucracy. The long and difficult process of 
getting new products approved for the market almost makes it feel like there is some 
sort of protectionism going on that makes it harder for foreign companies to compete 
in a leveled playfield. Things are simply more complicated than it need to be.  
 
During Astra Tech’s time in Japan it hasn’t really considered the overall state of the 
Japanese economy and this still remains true today. They look more at their own 
market sector and the potential to grow there. When they entered they saw potential 
for their products since Japanese people generally have bad teeth. And since this is 
still true they see potential in their market sector rather than potential in the Japanese 
economy as a whole.  
 
Astra Tech’s future development on the market is today a bit fussy as Astra Tech at 
the moment is being acquired and merged into another company, which is also active 
in Japan. However, Astra Techs forecast of the Japanese market is that it will be a 
good market and its sector will continue to develop on the market. 
4.2	  IKEA	  
Ingvar Kamprad founded IKEA in 1943 in a small town in Småland, Sweden. IKEA 
offers a wide range of well-designed, functional home furnishing products at prices so 
low that as many people as possible will be able to afford them. This is the idea at the 
heart of everything IKEA does, from product development and purchases to how they 
sell the products in IKEA stores globally.  
 
The person we interviewed was Janne Lundh, currently working as a Business Area 
responsible for IKEA in Kobe and he has been involved with IKEA’s operations in 
Japan since they re-entered the market in 2006. 
4.2.1 Establishment 
IKEA had a failed attempt at entering the Japanese market in 1976. At that time a 
Japanese distributor contacted them and the two companies started a joint venture 
called “Japanese-IKEA”. The furniture was imported from IKEA and was sold in a 
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store that did not have the classical IKEA characteristics. This ended up failing as the 
products were quite expensive and they were being labeled as “exotic”, this 
combination did not work out in Japan.  
 
The second time they entered the market, in 2006, they had learned from their 
previous mistakes and had put a lot of efforts and resources into understanding the 
market and also into insuring that they sent the right types of people to the country to 
get things running. A big part of this preparation was their Young Potentials Project 
(YPP). This project included 30 people in the first phase, among whom Janne Lundh 
is one, and another 30 people in the second phase. These people were the ones in 
charge of making the establishment in Japan successful and held the management 
during the introduction state on the Japanese market. These were people that had 
experience from living in Japan, the Japanese language and also from working at 
IKEA.  
 
“This time IKEA really took the time it needed in order to understand the Japanese 
culture and market prior to it’s second establishment” 
Janne Lundh, Business Area responsible IKEA, interview 
 
Acquiring land was one of the big obstacles in the beginning when they entered the 
market. The construction of a 40,000 square meter building involves a lot of troubles 
finding the right location and landowners who are willing to sell their land to a 
foreign company. Since earthquakes often hit Japan there was also the need to make 
the building as earthquake proof as possible. Thanks to these two obstacles the 
building of the first store was significantly more expensive than other stores of equal 
size in other parts of the world. Despite the amount of effort put into researching the 
market and regulations in Japan there were still some difficulties that had not been 
anticipated and as such they had to deal with these over time.  
 
During the establishment they did not have any significant problems in recruiting 
people. However if they could do it again they would have had a different approach to 
how they hired people. When IKEA explained to the employees how it would be to 
work at IKEA they described it as a working place consisting of an exotic and 
exciting working environment where a good work-life balance could be achieved. 
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However when people actually started to work it soon became clear that some were 
surprised with how high the workload could be at times. There were also problems 
with how the employees integrated with the customers. When shopping at IKEA you 
go around and chose the products that you want and then you pick these up from the 
storage area yourself. Some employees took this style of “mechanical shopping” as in 
that they were not supposed to interact with the customers. Due to this problem 
IKEA’s employees got a reputation of being cold and bad at customer service. 
According to Janne Lundh this as well originated in that IKEA had set wrong 
expectations for the employees and had to set new guidelines for the employees that 
for a Swede might be “obvious”. 
 
Janne Lundh says that when they hire people today they make sure that they convey 
the core values that IKEA expect their employees to have over the whole world. 
Qualities such as a willingness to help others, being able to take responsibility and a 
dedication to always do your best are premiered. Now they also know the general 
differences between Swedish and Japanese employees. Japanese employees are very 
efficient, fast and that they prefer to work in groups. Swedes are more flexible and 
they are better at taking initiatives by themselves, they don’t need direct orders from a 
superior to take care of problems.  
 
Janne Lundh fells that IKEA have had a big advantage thanks to the fact that IKEA is 
a Swedish company. In Japan there is a general curiosity about Sweden and people 
are interested in how it is possible that a country as small as Sweden can have so 
many big and successful companies operating globally. 
4.2.2 Management 
IKEA is a global company and all of its subsidiaries are to follow some managerial 
and structural guidelines regardless of where in the world they are located. The 
products in all stores are virtually the same; Janne Lundh believes that around 95% of 
the products sold in Japan are the same as those sold in Sweden. There are rules 
regarding the layout of the stores, how the stores are supposed to look and how every 
subsidiary should promote “Swedishness” and, as mentioned before, expectations of 
their employees. This way of managing its subsidiaries is also followed in Japan. 
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The subsidiaries do however have freedom regarding how they present their products 
to the customers, as what the customers demands differs quite a lot between countries. 
An example of this is the way that the “showrooms” within the stores look. In Japan 
they have much smaller “showrooms” since the Japanese people generally live in a 
much tighter space compared to Swedes.  
 
A couple of years ago there were as many as 60 Swedes employed at IKEA Japan, 
these were the people that came from the YPP program. Today the number of Swedes 
at IKEA in Japan is around 10. Most of the people that have left have relocated to 
other areas within IKEA. Which means that the management of the subsidiary is 
slowly being taken over by the Japanese from the former management of the YPP 
program. 
 
For those with a managerial position within IKEA there are possibilities to work in 
different countries. In Japan they are in a phase of expansion and as such they try to 
keep the employees they have, as they will be needed in the coming years. Thus not 
allowing especially high career mobility internationally within the company in Japan. 
 
IKEA have had to put a lot of resources into basically educating the Japanese people 
in what home furniture actually is. That the homes can be made into a much easier 
place to live with good storage while at the same time making it look better. They 
have had TV Shows that restore homes with IKEA products and there is a constant 
struggle trying to get more Japanese people to invest in homes furniture. This is an 
ongoing process that they will keep working on. Thanks to these efforts the general 
opinion and awareness of the company and its products is going up.   
 
IKEA is working with a global CSR program where they have initiatives that help 
children, promote sustainability and so forth. These are also included in the 
management of the Japanese subsidiary and always involve this as one of the top 
criteria’s at management level in Japan and in its business plans. Some of the parts 
where IKEA works with for example sustainability are not yet applied in Japan since 
these are not common in the Japanese society such as proper recycling but IKEA 
Japan works towards including all of its actions in Japan. 
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An example of IKEA Japans work with CSR is the actions right after the big 
earthquake in 2011. IKEA started a program to help out in several ways. It started by 
selling basic household items that where needed after the earthquake. In the second 
phase they sent out everything from pillows to kids-toys to the temporary housing 
locations where evacuees where living. In phase three of their support efforts they 
actually put up a sort of mini IKEA in Sendai, the area that got hit the hardest by the 
disaster. People could go there and buy what they needed for their new houses when 
they got them. They are currently in phase four of their relief efforts. In this phase 
they donate 100 yen (around 8 kronor) from every purchase made at their stores, to a 
fund that, amongst other things, helps children to get new toys. These efforts to help 
out when people needed it the most have further increased the company’s already 
good reputation in the country thus helping it on numerous levels.  
4.2.3 Consideration of the Japanese market and its development 
As mentioned earlier the Japanese market poses some difficulties for IKEA as its 
concept of home furnishing is not commonly know in Japan. IKEA does, much due to 
this, see a good potential to grow on the market as it feels that its market has a good 
potential for future growth. IKEA Japan is still in a phase of expansion as it has been 
since entering the market. There is room to grow and they are definitely planning to 
do so. IKEA has plans to keep opening up a new store every second year up until at 
least 2025.  
 
The fact that the Japanese economy as a whole is at a standstill actually opens up 
opportunities for IKEA since this has the potential to make their customer base even 
bigger, as IKEA has a position on the market with cheaper products. This can also be 
good from a competiveness point of view since most of the competition is in a price 
bracket above IKEA. Janne Lundh does however believe that the competition in their 
market will become harder in the future since the competition have started to adapt to 
IKEA’s success. 
4.3	  Sandvik	  
Sandvik is a high technology, engineering group with advanced products. Sandvik’s 
expertise in materials technology is their main strength (Sandvik). Sandvik has a 
world leading position in the production of tools for metal cutting, equipment used in 
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mining, construction and products in advanced stainless materials (Sandvik). 
Worldwide the company employs around 50,000 people. The person that we talked to 
at Sandvik was Anders Wallin, vice president at Sandvik group communications and 
previously the president for Sandvik Japan. We conducted the interview over the 
phone. 
4.3.1 Establishment 
Sandvik established their first Japanese Headquarter in Kobe in 1961. The Japanese 
subsidiary is its own unit; it is not under any regional office. In the 1970s the 
company started production in Sendai and since then they have started production in 
different areas as well, such as Tokyo. Today they have offices in several locations 
within Japan. 
 
The company does not see the bureaucracy in Japan as a problem as long as you 
accept that it exists. It makes thing move along slower but as long as you have 
competent people working for you it is not a problem. In Japan, Sandvik has an 
external person on their board who comes from the banking industry, this has helped 
the company in a plethora of different situations due to this persons connections and 
personal experience of dealing with the Japanese system. This is something that is not 
common in Sandvik’s other subsidiaries. 
 
“The real problem has been that Japanese people traditionally think of foreign 
companies as less competitive; foreign companies lack in quality, service, 
accountability and much more compared to Japanese companies and this has been 
the difficult part to prove that Sandvik is a company that is competitively strong and 
that Japanese companies aren't superior.”  
Anders Wallin, vice president group communications Sandvik, interview 
 
Anders Wallin is seeing a change in this trend and thinks that the change is gaining 
more and more momentum and that this will open a lot of doors for foreign 
companies. 
 
When Sandvik worked on its first production facility it was not welcome and there 
were efforts made by competitors and also the government to make it harder for the 
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company to complete the facility. However Anders Wallin does not know if and how 
Sandvik worked to counter this opposition since this happened too long ago. 
4.3.2 Management 
There is no difference in how Sandvik’s HQ manage its Japanese subsidiary as 
opposed to its subsidiaries in other countries. Sandvik’s policies are followed 
everywhere in the world. One example being their Grandpa principle. This policy 
means that for a new manager to be employed this person needs to be accepted by not 
only the boss of a specific area, but that the boss of the boss also needs to approve of 
this.  
 
Within the company managers generally don't move around too much between 
different countries. Specialists however, do move around between the company’s 
different subsidiaries since the company as a whole benefits from sharing the 
knowledge that these specialists have.  
 
The differences in management style between Sweden and Japan are not that big. 
Anders Wallin says that this is mainly due to the fact that the business culture in 
Sweden and Japan are quite alike. Both parties are quite “scared” of conflicts and we 
want to be in agreement through discussion rather than being more confrontational in 
discussions to not upset each other. There is a consensus culture in both countries, 
which makes management somewhat similar. 
 
Regarding the difficulties that comes with the cultural differences Anders Wallin says 
that Sandvik didn't really trust Japanese management until the beginning of the 21st 
century. Because of this the head of the Japanese subsidiary was not Japanese until 
the time when the two previous presidents of the Japanese subsidiary recommended a 
Japanese person for the position. The reasoning behind this was that both of the 
previous presidents believed that this was necessary for the development of the 
subsidiary in Japan.  
 
Generally Anders Wallin feels that the Japanese view themselves as a lonely country 
without friends and they do not feel that they are a part of the economic super power 
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that they are. This is reflected in their way of thinking and doing things from time to 
time. 
 
Sandvik has had a hard time recruiting graduates from the best Japanese schools since 
the students want to work at Japanese companies. Anders Wallin also believes that 
this was an even bigger problem back in the sixties when the company first 
established in Japan. At that time they almost exclusively employed English-speaking 
people. The problem is getting smaller since Sandvik is getting more well known and 
because of the fact that they now have been in Japan for over fifty years helps. 
 
The language barrier has been a problem since the Japanese people are generally bad 
at English. This is a problem when recruiting new people. For the day-to-day 
management this has meant that Swedes have had to use an interpreter as soon as they 
need to speak to someone below top management and here much is lost in translation. 
This also means that it takes longer time to build good relationships with people. 
 
One thing in particular that Sandvik appreciates with the Japanese is the fact that they 
are well prepared for disasters. During the 2011 earthquake both the management and 
the employees were well prepared and handled the situation very well. Even though 
there were some damages to the factory located in the areas that were heavily 
affected, production levels were back to normal within a few weeks.  
4.3.3 Consideration of the Japanese market and its development 
The demand on the Japanese market is based around the same products as in the rest 
of the world but they have faced strong competition from local companies. Japan is a 
really big market, one of the largest markets in the world for industrial companies. 
There is a negative attitude towards foreign companies. The market shows weak 
growth and this is seen as a threat. It also makes it harder to grow within the market. 
It has also been difficult to find good distribution networks in Japan.  
 
The Japanese economy is huge but shows low growth. However, Sandvik is 
successful at the moment. Another positive thing for the future is the fact that their 
competitors have had weak development compared to Sandvik, which of course 
makes Sandvik a stronger player in the market. 
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4.4	  Syncron	  
Syncron is a global supplier of software and services in the Supply Chain 
Management area. Syncron primarily work with large international manufacturers in 
five target industries; Mining and Construction, Industrial Equipment, Aerospace and 
Defense, Automotive Parts and Industrial Products. A majority of Syncron’s target 
customers are found in Europe, North America and East Asia. Syncron is 
headquartered in Stockholm, Sweden. Other locations are Malmö, Birmingham, 
Warsaw, Atlanta and Tokyo. The office in Tokyo is responsible for sales, 
implementation and support of the Syncron solutions for the customer base in Japan 
and East Asia. 
 
The individuals who answered our questionnaire are Kristina Olsson, Head of Global 
Professional Services, and Dag Sjöqvist, the CFO of Syncron Group and also a Board 
Member of Syncron Japan. 
4.4.1 Establishment 
As part of Syncron’s long-term strategy to become a global leading supplier within its 
fields the company decided in 2008 to establish local presence in Japan. 
Simultaneously with the establishment of the office in Tokyo, Syncron secured a 
major contract with a Japanese company active in the construction and mining 
equipment industry.  
 
When Syncron entered the Japanese market they did this with a greenfield approach 
and they got assistance from the Swedish Trade Council. 
 
During the establishment process Syncron had to adapt to the Japanese way of doing 
business. For example, the commercial relationship between suppliers and customers 
is different in Japan compared to a European environment in terms of viewing the 
customer as more of a collaboration partner than a counterpart.  
 
In combination with understanding and adapting to a different way of conducting 
business Syncron faced challenges in attracting and recruiting the right individuals to 
drive the Syncron operations in Japan. At initiation of the operations in Tokyo 
Syncron did not have local Japanese employees and this was a major obstacle when 
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delivering a major project to a large and demanding customer both from a language 
point of view but also as a way of bridging the cultural differences between the head 
office and the local office. Being a European based company with no brand awareness 
in Japan meant it took time to bring the right individuals on board.  
 
Despite several difficulties during the establishment phase there have also been many 
possibilities for Syncron as there is a great interest and respect in Japan for new 
technology and innovation. Being a Swedish originated Software Company Syncron 
has experienced a great interest and respect for their offerings.  
 
Regarding if Syncron had anticipated these difficulties they say that the language and 
cultural differences were expected but probably not to the extent that it actually faced. 
Despite being part of the long term strategy the actual establishment of the Japanese 
office was carried out on short notice and with minimal research.  
 
The company also received great administrative support from the Swedish Trade 
Council. However, in retrospect they say that they should have staffed the operations 
differently from the beginning with a very senior expat from the core European 
operations on the ground in combination with bringing onboard experienced local 
Japanese employees. 
 
Syncron has not had any problems with the bureaucracy in Japan. They think that it 
has been very straightforward and that they have gotten timely deliveries from the 
authorities. In general they feel that being a Swedish company has been a 
disadvantage due to the difficulties regarding sales and attracting talent. Their target 
industries have more trust in Japanese companies.  
4.4.2 Management 
Syncron’s HQ has high influence on their Japanese subsidiary’s activities. They act as 
one global company with common processes rather than in a model with independent 
subsidiaries. Above that the Japan office is small and collaborates closely with the 
rest of the company. The Japanese subsidiary also has the responsibility for the East 
Asia region. 
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Currently they have no Swedes employed in Japan. They do however have a member 
from the Swedish management team that works in Japan on a regular basis. During 
periods they have had up to four Swedes working in the country. These had no 
management position but they were still able to influence management since they had 
longer experience at Syncron than the Japanese management.  
 
Within the company they encourage career mobility, they believe that it’s 
instrumental to ensure that they foster and sustain their “one global company” culture. 
 
Syncron feels that the difference between Swedish and Japanese working culture is 
that in Sweden there are very high ceilings. People raise their opinions. Management 
is approachable and easy to talk to and in Japan it is more formal.  
 
Syncron has had a hard time recruiting talented people in Japan. The reason for this 
being that it’s hard for a relatively small Swedish company with an unknown brand 
and a newly established office in Japan that requires fluency in both Japanese and 
English to attract and find good employees. 
 
Generally, there is also a long time horizon behind each business decision in Japan 
and willingness to invest heavily in building a relationship with a customer. From 
time to time they have had difficulties with combining this way of conducting 
business with Syncron’s financial goals, which are based on quarterly time periods 
rather than ten-year targets.  
 
During the 2011 earthquake the employees had difficulties to get to work but still 
continued their work from home. The Swedish CEO was also in Japan at the time, 
which helped in understanding and dealing with the situation. 
4.4.3 Consideration of the Japanese market and its development 
The demands of the market are the same in Japan as everywhere else. Their target 
industries have very similar processes and challenges that their product portfolio 
addresses. The demand does not differ, the competition does. 
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The strong yen continues to be a major problem for the export industry that affects 
their target customers negatively whilst the construction market in Japan is 
experiencing growth, which is positive for Syncron’s target customers. Regarding 
their competition in the market they believe that it is becoming both easier and harder. 
Easier since Japanese companies seem more and more willing to invest in foreign 
software solutions. Harder since that also means that other foreign software 
companies establish in the market. 
4.5	  Vitrolife	  
Vitrolife is an international life science company that was founded in 1993. The 
company has three main product areas: Fertility, Transplantation and Stem Cell 
Cultivation with approximately 220 employees. Vitrolife’s products are sold in over 
90 markets around the world and Vitrolife has established subsidiaries in USA, 
Australia, France, Italy, United Kingdom and Japan. Vitrolife’s Production facilities 
are located in Sweden and the USA. The one who answered our questionnaire, via 
mail, is Marcus Hedenskog who is the Representative Director Japan. 
4.5.1 Establishment 
Vitrolife’s products first reached Japan in 2000 trough a distributor. Vitrolife reached 
out to Japan because Japan is the largest market in the world for its products. In 2009 
Vitrolife felt that it was time to enter on its own and did so via greenfield investment.   
 
When Vitrolife entered Japan they faced severe competition, high set up costs and 
problem with securing good personnel. To recruit talented personnel is always 
difficult and expensive but Marcus Hedenskog already had a good network of people 
in Japan that he wanted to hire when he established Vitrolife Japan, which made the 
process easier. 
 
The establishment process for Vitrolife took 2-3 month of basic research and 2-3 
months of establishing the company it self. When establishing in Japan the Japanese 
bureaucracy did not pose any large problems, only some delays of custom clearance 
for Vitrolife's products. The Japanese laws and regulations did not pose any problem 
for Vitrolife either. 
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To be a Swedish company in Japan has been an advantage for Vitrolife. Swedish 
companies have a reputation for high quality and also some inventions in Vitrolife's 
business area and both these factors have helped Vitrolife. 
4.5.2 Management 
The Japanese subsidiary has responsibility for its day-to-day business and has little 
interference from HQ but as the business is growing HQ gets more and more 
interested in the Japanese operations. In Japan there is one Swede employed and that 
is Marcus Hedenskog, in total there are five people employed in Japan. 
 
Since Vitrolife is a fairly young and small company, at least on a global scale, 
Vitrolife does not have high mobility within the company between its different 
subsidiaries. 
 
In Japan Vitrolife conducts a mixture of Swedish and Japanese management. One 
example of “Swedish” management is that Vitrolife give the employees much 
freedom to reach set goals (e.g. management own working time, visiting schedules 
etc.).  Vitrolife also try to work very closely as a team or kind of a family so to ensure 
that everyone is working towards same goal. 
 
Vitrolife’s main problem with cultural differences is the definition of quality in Japan, 
which differ from the Swedish one. The problem for Vitrolife Japan is getting HQ to 
understand the differences and adapt to these. 
 
For Vitrolife Japan it can be difficult to recruit new young talent since it is a small and 
fairly unknown company in Japan. However, Vitrolife offers a high flexibility and 
freedom in how they preform their work and this can be attractive to some but not all. 
 
The language barrier has not been a problem for Marcus Hedenskog since he is fluent 
in Japanese. When putting customers in direct contact with HQ the language barrier 
can be a problem. 
 
To adapt to the Japanese market Vitrolife have implemented some additional quality 
control measures for some products i.e. additional inspections in Japan. Some defects, 
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which are acceptable outside japan, are not accepted in Japan. Vitrolife also from time 
to time need to adapt the marketing material from HQ so that it will appeal to the 
Japanese market and sometimes even do it from scratch in Japan.  
 
The 2011 disaster had no impact on Vitrolife’s business. However, Marcus 
Hedenskog saw that some companies left Japan after the earthquake, which can be a 
bad sign for the future. 
4.5.3 Consideration of the Japanese market and its development 
The Japanese market demands high quality and has its own definition of quality that 
doesn’t always fit with the Swedish perception of quality. Hence, the Swedish more 
“rational” quality can’t always be applied with the same success in Japan. Marcus 
Hedenskog also feels that the Japanese aren't as price sensitive as other markets and 
that a strong relationship is something that the Japanese often value over product and 
price. 
 
The positive aspect of the Japanese market for Vitrolife is that it is a large market. 
However, the market is growing slowly and it takes a lot of time and effort to 
succeed. 
 
For the future in Japan Vitrolife expect that the market will continue its slow growth 
and is not currently doing anything in particular to adapt to the future. Vitrolife feels 
that Asia is becoming more and more important for its business and will have a focus 
on China and Japan for its near future growth in Asia. 
 
Vitrolife does see that new competition is entering the market and that this is making 
the situation harder as all companies need to fight for market shares. 
4.6	  Wallenius	  Wilhelmsen	  Logistics	  (WWL)	  
WWL is a Nordic company that was formed from the merger of the Swedish logistics 
company Wallenius and the Norwegian logistics company Wilhelmsen in 1999. Due 
to its Swedish roots we have chosen to include them in our research of Swedish 
companies in Japan. WWL has a focus on heavier cargo such as cars, trucks, special 
cargo and heavy equipment. The person we interviewed at WWL is Mats Steinnes 
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who is chief of staff at the Asian region office in Tokyo, Japan and has been active in 
Japan during the past four years and roughly a year of these at WWL. 
4.6.1 Establishment 
Before the merger in 1999 both companies were active in Japan and had entered on 
their own. The Swedish company entered in 1961 and the Norwegian company in the 
1970s. Up until the merger these two have been acting as competitors on the market 
and on this specific market the Swedish company was the most successful and had the 
largest market share.  
 
When the Swedish company entered the Japanese market they had carriers that were 
superior to the carriers for cars that the competitors had at the time. These carriers 
were made so that it could take more cars and also had a much lower damage ratio to 
the cars. They were pioneers in the new way of loading and un-loading cars on 
carriers, their “roll on roll off” way of loading cars were unique at that time and today 
all major car carriers utilizes this system. This made the company competitive on the 
market and proved their strong stance for their costumers. Even though Japanese 
competitors soon acquired such vessels themselves Wallenius had gotten a foot in on 
the market and a reputation for quality and safety, which is what has made Wallenius 
and now WWL, a strong player in the Japanese market. 
 
The bureaucracy in Japan is not something that is posing any sever problems for 
WWL. The bureaucracy in Japan takes much time and manpower but as the company 
has adapted to this it does not pose a problem. Mats Steinnes has heard of other 
companies that have been hurt when introducing new products and such but this is not 
something that affects WWLs products and services and he does not feel that WWL is 
being treated any worse than its Japanese competitors.  
 
In Japan Mats Steinnes feels that there is an advantage being from Scandinavia, both 
on a corporate and personal level. Scandinavia is known for its high quality products 
and services and is also famous for its well-fare system. It can be easier doing 
business in Japan when coming from Scandinavia but it is not enough to close a deal. 
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4.6.2 Management 
The region office for Asia in Japan is not controlled by the HQ to a high extent and 
control most of its actions alone and also holds most of the contracts that concerns its 
area. The HQ controls revenues and so forth but all the day-to-day and overall 
business decisions concerning its area are done in Tokyo, Japan. There is no special 
treatment of the Asian region office or its Japanese subsidiary compared to others 
region offices but just the fact that the region office for Asia is placed in Japan proves 
its importance. 
 
At the Japanese regional office there are around hundred employees and among these 
there are ten non-Japanese. The company wishes to move people around to its 
different subsidiaries to increase co-operation between its subsidiaries. For example 
most of the non-Japanese at the Japanese subsidiary are from other offices around the 
world and are stationed there for a period of 3 to 5 years. This is done to create an 
international environment within the company. In this business there is a need for 
internationalization due to the fact that most shipments goes of to other countries 
there is a need to understand and being efficient when dealing with other countries 
and cultures. 
 
Mats Steinnes thinks the management in Japan and Scandinavia has much in common 
in dealing with its employees and neither has the hire and fire culture that can be 
found in the US or Britain. But in Japan the social security is not as good as in 
Scandinavia and therefore WWL is very careful with who they hire and gentle when 
laying people off. Mats Steinnes is also seeing that the lifetime employment that has 
been so popular in Japan is now slowly but surely disappearing. It still exist but not to 
the same extent as before. 
 
“If we fire an employee in Japan there is no social network in place that protects him 
and his family, because of this we are generally very careful about firing people in 
Japan” 
Mats Steinnes, chief of staff of the Asian region office WWL, interview 
 
Mats Steinnes thinks that it can be difficult to reach the absolute top talent when 
hiring people. WWL typically has two kind of people who apply for their jobs, first 
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there those who see WWL as their second hand choice after the Japanese companies 
and then there are those who see WWL as attractive due to the fact that it is a 
Scandinavian company, a company that doesn’t expect you to only work but 
understands that there is a life outside work. The salary offered by WWL is slightly 
above the Japanese average. Those who are the best-qualified applicants usually have 
some connection to Scandinavia. 
 
The language barrier poses a problem for Mats Steinnes and WWL in Japan and may 
be the largest challenge faced in Japan. A Japanese who speak good English is far 
below a Scandinavian who speak good English. To speak English is something that is 
a must when working at WWL in Japan. 
 
During the aftermath of the earthquake in 2011 WWL did help out. WWL helped out 
by providing its logistic services, volunteers from the company and monetary 
donations. This was done because WWL Japan felt that this was the right thing to do 
and had nothing to do with its businesses. However, WWL afterwards feels that it 
might have hurt the company if it hadn’t helped out in some way. 
4.6.3 Consideration of the Japanese market and its development 
The positive side of the Japanese market is that it demand high quality and is prepared 
to pay extra for it, which serves WWL well. Always stay true to a deal. Even in the 
worst times the companies pay the same amount for each car, which would not have 
been the case in China for example. 
 
The negative side of the Japanese market is that if you don't got good enough 
relations things can be really hard and for new companies this pose a problem even on 
the personal level since new people in Japan have a hard time doing business 
efficiently. Today this is not as big a problem for WWL since they have been in Japan 
for some time now.  
 
Overall Mats Steinnes thinks that what makes the Japanese market unique is the focus 
on high quality that can be seen on every level of doing business and also on every 
product sold within Japan. 
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WWL is seeing that the companies they serve are considering moving to other 
countries and in this WWL wants to follow in order to continue providing their 
services. In order to be the obvious choice for the companies in question WWL is 
now working on establishing good relations with these and through that create an 
advantage when establishing new contracts. 
 
There has been some discussion whether WWL’s Asian region office should remain 
in Japan or if it should be moved to new more attractive markets. China and Shanghai 
has been on the board but this will probably not happen due to raising labor cost and 
lower quality workers than in Japan. The markets that are starting to emerge are the 
markets in South East Asia where WWL eventually might be moving their regional 
office. 
 
WWL feels that the competition in Japan is strong and that the market has grown to 
its full potential. It is no longer possible or rather, very hard to grow by expanding the 
market further.  
 
“They are not building any more car factories in Japan, as such we are now focusing 
on protecting our market share within the country rather than trying to expand it.” 
Mats Steinnes, chief of staff of the Asian region office WWL, interview 
 
On a longer perspective for WWL in Japan there are movements as the Japanese car 
manufacturers have started to consider moving the plant to other countries due to the 
fact that natural disasters are common in Japan. 
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5. Analysis 
In this chapter the empirical findings are compared with the theoretical framework 
and the findings are discussed and analyzed  
5.1	  Culture	  
What all of the companies in our study have in common is the fact that all of them 
have faced problems due to the cultural differences between Sweden and Japan. This 
is not a big surprise when we look at the differences displayed by Hofstede's cultural 
dimensions (Hofstede) that the two countries display when looking at Figure 1. 
 
Johanson & Vahlne (1977) write about the fact that companies prefer to first enter 
markets with less physical distance. Physical distance consists of factors such as 
differences in language, culture and political systems, all of which are present when 
comparing Sweden and Japan. This is a reason why most of the companies in our 
sample have established themselves in other countries prior to entering the big 
Japanese market.  
 
Despite the different amounts of research the companies conducted before entering 
Japan, ranging from IKEA’s years of research to Syncron’s minimal amounts, the 
companies have faced mostly the same problems. 
 
Sandvik, Syncron and WWL all report that they have had problems with hiring 
qualified personnel. Today Sandvik’s problems relating to the difficulties of hiring 
qualified personnel are less severe than in the past, thanks to the good reputation of 
Sandvik. WWL reports that they still have problems finding the right people despite 
having been in the country for a long time. As Mats Steinnes, Chief of Staff says: 
 
“WWL typically has two kind of people who apply for jobs, first there are those who 
see WWL as their second hand choice after the Japanese companies and then there 
are those who see WWL as attractive… The best-qualified persons who apply usually  
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have some connection to Scandinavia.” 
Mats Steinnes, chief of staff of the Asian region office WWL, interview 
 
For IKEA and Astra Tech the problems are described as less severe. IKEA had no 
problems hiring people. Rather, IKEA’s problems were related to the fact that they 
gave the wrong picture of the company to the new employees, and as such they had 
problems internally with handling personnel correctly. Astra Tech says that they 
probably would have had more problems if it weren’t for the help that they received 
from their Japanese distributor.  
 
What has been reported from all the companies is that one of the main factors that 
make it difficult to hire Japanese employees is that their English level is very low 
compared to other countries. 
 
The only company that hasn’t had any problems with hiring people is Vitrolife. This 
can be attributed to the fact that Marcus Hedenskog, Representative Director, is fluent 
in Japanese and that he already knew the four people that he hired for the company.  
 
The problems that the companies have had with hiring people can be largely 
attributed to Japans high scores of uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation. 
The fact is that most Japanese people wish to work in a Japanese company rather than 
a foreign company. This is connected with the Japanese people’s preference to avoid 
uncertain situations. It simply gives them more security to work at a Japanese firm 
that has a long history in the country as opposed to working at a Swedish firm that has 
just opened up its doors in Japan. However these problems lessen the longer a 
Swedish company has been active in Japan, as more people become familiar with it 
and the fact that the general view of foreign companies has becomes increasingly 
positive in Japan. 
 
This is also shown in our data since Sandvik reports that this is exactly what has 
happened for them. They have now been active in Japan for more than 50 years. 
During this time they have built up a reputation of delivering high quality products 
and that it is a good company to work at. Due to this, any problems with finding 
qualified personnel were diminished. 
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Astra Tech and Syncron both stress the fact that it is true that the Japanese business 
culture is different from Swedish business culture. As a result, there is a need to 
realize and accept this as a fact and work with the system rather than against it. As 
said by Peter Selley, CEO at Astra Tech:  
 
“As long as you understand that the Japanese does things differently, and that they 
need to go through their process, things work out very well in the end.” 
Peter Selley, CEO Astra Tech, interview 
 
One of the main differences compared to the business culture in Sweden is the fact 
that all decisions take much longer to initiate. The feeling that meetings aren’t going 
anywhere, that people are simply there to discuss things rather than taking action 
combined with the fact that Japanese people are very un-confrontational during 
discussions, means that meetings may take a long time to finish. Once again this can 
be attributed to Japan’s high long-term orientation score, with the long time horizon 
on decisions causes a sense for Swedish people that nothing is happening. The 
advantage of this is as said by Peter Selley, CEO at Astra Tech:  
 
 
“The fact that when a decision is made everyone knows what they are supposed to do 
and that they are very effective when things are set in motion.” 
Peter Selley, CEO Astra Tech, interview 
 
This feeling experienced by Swedes during meetings with Japanese people, that they 
are not progressing with their discussions, correlates well with what Jandt (2003) 
discusses, in that Japanese people can understand each other with few words. As such 
Swedes will have trouble with understanding the nuances embedded in the 
discussions, and as a consequence they feel that things are not moving at a pace that 
they are familiar with.  
 
Some of the problems IKEA have faced are quite unique among the companies 
included in this thesis. This is due to the fact that they are a retailer and as such their 
employees needs to handle consumers directly. These problems that IKEA faced can 
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mostly be attributed to the difference in power distance between the countries. 
Japanese people are used to obeying orders of what needs to be done. What happened 
for IKEA was that the combination of their employees being used to receiving orders 
and its miscommunication regarding what working at IKEA really consisted of ended 
up giving the company’s employees a bad reputation. When an employee hadn’t 
received any specific orders at what to do they often chose to just stand behind their 
desks instead of walking around helping customers.  
 
Another unique problem for IKEA was the fact that they have had to educate their 
customers about what home furnishing really is. Initially there was a lot of skepticism 
from the customers about IKEA’s products, but over time and due to IKEA’s 
workshops and commercials, the Japanese people became more and more prepared  to 
buy IKEA furniture. This problem can be attributed to Japan’s high scores of 
uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation, in that it takes time for customers to 
trust a new company regardless of how new and exciting it seems to be.  
 
To conclude, we feel that the differences displayed when comparing Sweden and 
Japan’s different scores gives a good overall picture of what kind of cultural 
differences can be expected in Japan. Several of the problems that the companies have 
experienced correlate well with the difference in power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance and long-term orientation. However, we did not see any problems that 
could be correlated to the differences in masculinity. It is clear that the male and 
female roles in business differ greatly between the two countries; as such the male 
values are much stronger in Japan than in Sweden. However, none of the companies 
had experienced any problems associated with this. Some of the answers can be 
associated with the differences between the countries scores of individualism, mostly 
due to facts such as the companies saying that Japanese people work best in groups 
and that in the business climate in Japan, partners are seen as partners and not as 
counterparts. This thus supporting the fact that the Japanese have a lower 
individualism score than Sweden. As such, we do not see support for the study that 
Woodring (1995) conducted. Our findings do not show that the younger generations 
would be more individualistic than the older generations. 
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5.2	  Establishment	  
After analyzing our empirical data we can see that most of the companies in our thesis 
have not followed the four steps that is explained by Johanson & Vahlne’s (1977) 
Uppsala model. The only company that does this is Sandvik. A big industrial 
company that started exporting to Japan early in the twentieth century. It is unclear if 
they had a Japanese distributor at the time, although it is highly likely, before setting 
up their own HQ in the country in 1961. In the seventies they built their own factory 
in the country.  
 
Sandvik is the only company that has had any kind of successful export activities to 
Japan prior to their entry in the market, in other words it is the only company that did 
not skip step one of the Uppsala model. The reason to why the different companies 
didn’t take step one in the model differs. For example, for Syncron it was simply not 
worth the effort since they are a software company and for Astra Tech it was too hard 
to get their products approved in Japan without being present in the country.  
 
The only company that has been successful at entering the market from step two of 
the Uppsala model is Vitrolife. Due to the company’s small size and the fact that the 
one in charge of the establishment had good connections in Japan and good 
knowledge about the market and the country, and as such they managed to have a 
successful establishment that is currently at step three of the Uppsala model due to 
their sales office in the country.  
 
During IKEA’s first effort to enter the Japanese market they did this via a Japanese 
distributor that contacted them, in other words they started out at step two of the 
Uppsala model. However, the concept of IKEA-Japan did not work out as planned 
and they failed. Johanson & Vahlne (2009) write about the importance of relations 
and market knowledge when internationalizing and it seems that IKEA did not realize 
this and the biggest reason for their failure could be contributed to their lack of market 
knowledge.  
 
The second time IKEA made an effort to establish in the country they did this with a 
firm backing of the knowledge that came from researching the conditions of the 
Japanese market as well as a firm belief in the IKEA concept. As Johanson & Vahlne 
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(2009: 1427) say in their article: “A rapidly growing number of modern firms are 
built around a brand, a design, or patented technology for which production and 
services are performed by a network of other firms (e.g., Nike, IKEA).” 
 
The strength of IKEA’s brand and concept is clear since they are now successful in 
Japan despite the fact that they skipped the first three steps of the Uppsala model. 
They went straight to step four by starting out with the construction of an IKEA store 
without any Japanese partners. This strategy does correlate well with one of the 
reasons why a company might skip a more gradual increase of commitment that 
Johanson & Vahlne (1990) discusses. That an already big company can take more 
risks than a smaller company and as such it might skip some steps in the Uppsala 
model. Another important aspect that seems to have been important for the company’s 
success in Japan is that they put a lot of effort into sending employees to Japan that 
already had experiences from both Japan and IKEA. In other words they tried to make 
sure that they would become an insider in the market when they entered this second 
time. This effort by IKEA also supports Whitelock’s (2002) argument that the most 
important knowledge to gain is the knowledge of personal experience, since IKEA 
obviously felt that this type of knowledge was very important for them.  
 
Regarding the importance of networks that Johanson & Vahlne (2009) writes about 
we can see that Astra Tech, Vitrolife and IKEA have had great advantages due to the 
connections that they have established in the country before their entry on the market. 
The sole reason why Astra Tech became interested in the Japanese market was that a 
Japanese distributor contacted them due to their interest in Astra Tech’s products. 
After the initial contact there were only a few years until they entered the market, and 
through their communications over the years their relation grew stronger. Since their 
establishment in the market Astra Tech have had advantages thanks to their relations 
with insiders within the market, with matters ranging from hiring employees to their 
connection with customers. This shows the importance of the ability to capitalize on 
opportunities that Johanson & Vahlne write about. That being an insider in a network 
helps with both seeing and capitalizing on opportunities.  
 
IKEA learned a lot during their first attempt at establishing the company in Japan. 
The lessons learned during the failed attempt helped with being successful during 
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their second attempt. For Vitrolife the importance of networks is clear since Marcus 
Hedenskog’s, representative director in Japan, prior experience and knowledge from 
Japan helped during the establishment process. All of the Japanese employees were a 
part of his social network and as such he knew that these people would be good 
employees to have at the company. 
 
To summarize, the results show that Johanson & Vahlne’s (1977) Uppsala model is 
quite outdated and this due to the fact that only one of the companies included in this 
thesis really followed the four steps. Our findings correlate well with the critique 
Hedelund & Kvarneland (1984) put forward. The companies do not appear to have 
felt that physical distance was their main cause of uncertainty. This due to the 
increased amounts of information that can be gathered about Japan as well as the fact 
that most of the companies included in this thesis have put a lot of value into 
achieving strong relations and good amounts of personal experiences from the market. 
In other words, they acquire this information before entry as opposed to learning it by 
themselves as they would have done if they utilized a more gradually increased 
commitment to the market that the Uppsala model’s four steps would have 
accomplished. This behavior correlates well with what Johanson & Vahlne (2009) 
write about. That in today’s business environment networks is of the outmost 
importance. Outsidership is now the main cause of uncertainty as opposed to physical 
distance. We feel that this theory is applicable to the way that the Japanese business 
environment works today. As such, companies that are looking at entering the 
Japanese market would be well served to take this in consideration when they are 
planning their entrance strategy. 
5.3	  Managerial	  decisions	  	  
As discussed earlier the aim of this thesis in terms of management is to scrutinize 
three of the larger areas of subsidiary management in Japan for Swedish companies. 
Here we will investigate if the empirical data is supporting the theories or 
contradicting them to form a proper backing for which theories to use and how. 
HR management 
The employment process and the challenges faced there have been discussed under 
culture where it shows to be quite large differences between Sweden and Japan. For 
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all companies that utilized a green field approach, HQ has had a high involvement in 
hiring and controlling HR decisions. This involvement has for most companies 
lessened as time have passed. Mainly due to that the subsidiaries got more developed 
and independent. This is however not surprising as HQ initiates the establishment and 
controls it.  
 
The really interesting part is how the management of HR is conducted and 
connections between HQ and the subsidiary is integrated once the subsidiary is 
properly established. In our empirical findings there are a variety of different 
strategies used but within these are some common traits. Many of these traits coincide 
with theory but there are some cases where the theory needs to be twisted a bit to 
make it applicable for this situation. 
 
The cultural dimensions described by Hofstede (1984) suggests that there should be 
large differences, which in turn would mean difficulties associated with managing 
Japanese employees. This has been highly contradicted in our interviews where most 
of he interviewees claim that management in Japan and Sweden are much alike. For 
example:  
 
“Management in Japan and Scandinavia have much in common in dealing with its 
employees for example neither has the hire and fire culture that can be found in the 
US or Britain.” 
Mats Steinnes, chief of staff of the Asian region office WWL, interview 
 
“Much is alike in management culture between Sweden and Japan we are both 
“scared” of conflicts and wants to agree on as much as possible and not upset the 
other part. There is a consensus culture in both countries.” 
Anders Wallin, Vice president of Group communications Sandvik, interview 
 
Generally the subsidiaries also have a pretty high integration with Sweden and the rest 
of the company even after the establishment process is done. The Swedish 
management ideas are also used to a high extent at the subsidiaries in Japan. This 
follows the traits found by Dolles & Takahashi (2011) of easier adaption for foreign 
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companies since these does not have to follow the unwritten rules thus being able to 
adapt Swedish management ideas. 
 
When we first reviewed Hofstede’s cultural dimension one by one the differences 
between Japan and Sweden could clearly be viewed. However when these are put into 
an HR management perspective and not viewed one by one but together the 
differences are not at all as vast as Hofstede’s numbers suggest. This divergence of 
the theory has been observed by Hofstede (1983) but for US companies in Japan. This 
was basically explained as an exception of the rule. But here it can be observed once 
again and this in Japan as well, by a country that has even higher differences to Japan 
than the US (Hofstede, 1984). 
 
There are some differences between the different companies strategies but all except 
Astra Tech and WWL are more or less operating by an ethnocentric strategy. Astra 
Tech utilizes the polycentric strategy and WWL more of the region centric strategy. 
 
As Heenan & Perlmutter’s (1979) EPRG model describes it the possible management 
strategies in a foreign country will to a high extent be decided by the differences in 
management culture. By then regarding Hofstede’s (1984) cultural dimensions it is 
easy to conclude that it will be a polycentric strategy that will be the best and most 
efficient as the differences between the two countries are vast. However in this case 
we have found that most companies actually thinks that the two management cultures 
share many traits and therefore are able to utilize Swedish management styles in 
Japan, meaning that these companies utilizes an ethnocentric strategy. From an 
industry perspective it is important to recognize this and understand that Japan might 
be geographically far off but in HR management the differences are not at all as grave 
as suggested by theory. 
Product strategies 
Our empirical findings have clearly showed that Swedishness is something of value in 
Japan. One thing that was mentioned in every interview was that Sweden has a 
reputation of high quality products. The interviewees explain Japan as a country 
where quality is of the outmost importance for a customer. In the Japanese market, 
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where quality means as much as it does the Swedish reputation of high quality clearly 
is an advantage.   
 
The product adaption to Japan by the Swedish companies have been limited, as the 
reputation and attraction for Swedish products are high. For Businees-to-Consumer 
(B2C) companies the adaption is higher as these are aimed directly to the public 
where as the Business-to-Business (B2B) companies are catering pretty much the 
same products and services wherever in the world these are. Hence smaller noticeable 
differences concerning the B2B companies in this study. 
 
By a quick estimate from Janne Lundh, business area responsible, 95% of the 
products IKEA sell in Japan are the same as those sold in Sweden. To see that a 
company as big and exposed as IKEA only has adapted to this extent and that the 
other companies barely at all have changed its products for Japan provides a solid 
ground for stating that an ethnocentric or geocentric product strategy is highly 
efficient in Japan. Another, maybe more concrete, conclusion is that a polycentric 
product strategy isn’t needed for Swedish companies in Japan. As Sweden is a highly 
developed country this concurs with Bilkey & Nes  (1982) that claimed that 
developed countries have higher attraction than low developed countries. 
Nonetheless, many companies have established extra quality controls for products at 
the Japanese market and this can be important to keep in mind, as Japan is a highly 
demanding market in terms of quality. 
 
For usage of this in practice it is good to know that Sweden has a good reputation in 
Japan, especially for quality. However, the value of this should not be exaggerated. 
Sweden’s reputation for high quality will help and make it easier in some aspects but 
as mentioned by Mats Steinnes, Chief of Staff, WWL, this is rarely enough to close a 
deal. It is valuable to know that an adaption of the products to Japan specifically isn’t 
used to a high extent, which might make it easier for other companies considering the 
Japanese market.  
CSR/Risk management 
Japan is one of the richest and most developed countries in the world, which means 
that many of the risks usually connected to risk management are non-existing such as 
	   55	  
severe poverty, access to clean water, poor working conditions and so forth. 
Nonetheless Japan poses other risks such as earthquakes and tsunamis, as it is the 
world’s most seismically active country. The fact that many of the risk are non-
existing in Japan has been supported by our empirical findings where most see Japan 
as a low risk country. This has, for all of the companies except IKEA, meant that no 
extra focus has been put on Japan for CSR or risk management. These companies all 
feel that there is a reputational gain in Japan from the activities carried out in other 
parts of the world. No company has felt that there is any pressure from the community 
to actively work with CSR in Japan, which correlates well with Tokoro (2007) who 
state the low level of NPOs and the lack of influence of these in Japan. All in all for 
these companies a geocentric strategy for CSR and risk management suffice in Japan.  
 
For IKEA it is different since it is a B2C company. IKEA is more exposed to the 
community, which means that the common man has a higher awareness of IKEAs 
actions than the other companies in this study. As IKEA is scrutinized to a higher 
level it has more to gain and lose from proper or poor CSR and risk management. The 
Japanese subsidiary has a high focus on CSR and aim at including it in all its business 
plans. The work done in Japan after the disaster in 2011 shows that this isn’t empty 
words. However, Janne Lundh, Business area Responsible claims that this isn’t 
something that is unique for Japan rather a clear strategy for IKEA in general. In other 
words IKEA also uses a well-structured geocentric strategy where it is able to quickly 
react at the local markets.  
 
In conclusion it is possible to see that for both B2C and B2B companies in Japan a 
geocentric strategy is preferred and there isn’t any mentionable pressure on Swedish 
companies in this area in Japan.  	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6. Conclusion 
In this final chapter we aim to summarize the results of our study in a way that is 
directly connected to our core questions. We also give suggestions regarding how our 
theoretical framework might be used in future research and we outline our own 
criticism and limitations to our study.  
6.1	  Summary	  
Our data shows that the companies included in our thesis have been able to manage 
successful establishment processes in Japan via a multitude of different ways. This 
shows that there is no particular part of the entrance process that’s been taken into 
consideration by all of the companies. Every company is unique and because of this 
they have used different approaches when establishing themselves in Japan. Most 
companies have actively worked with establishing strong connections with the 
Japanese market and through this work managed to attain an insidership on different 
levels. This, if anything, seems to have been the main thing that the companies 
included in this thesis have taken into particular consideration when entering the 
Japanese market. 
 
All but one of the companies has experienced difficulties related to the unique 
Japanese culture. This regardless of the amount of time and effort they actually put 
into researching the Japanese market prior to entering the country. This shows the 
importance of understanding the market. Without the efforts that had been made by 
the companies to understand the market they would certainly have faced more 
problems. It is clear that that the companies have taken the potential problem of 
cultural differences into particular consideration. This since they put a lot of effort 
into researching the Japanese culture prior to entry. 
 
Even though the companies in our study are different in many ways there has still 
been a pattern in the parts of management that we have analyzed. In HR management 
we surprisingly saw that Swedish HR management styles are highly applicable even 
though Hofstede’s cultural dimensions show a vast difference in culture. Swedish 
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products are attractive in Japan since they have a reputation of high quality products. 
This means that in general, Swedish companies does not need to alter their products to 
any higher extent for the Japanese market. Managing a subsidiary in Japan in terms of 
CSR has proved to be a relatively easy task as there is not a high pressure to conduct 
CSR activities. The risk management in Japan has been sparse for the companies in 
this study as they consider it to be a low risk country. Overall, the Swedish companies 
have not adapted their subsidiary management in Japan to a high extent. Most of the 
companies have structured their subsidiary management according to its general 
subsidiary strategy and been able to utilize Swedish management styles in many 
aspects and this seems to work well for the companies.  
 
The future prospect of the Japanese market seems to be mostly positive from the 
companies we have interviewed; there are of course some differences due to the 
varying natures of the companies. What appreciated in the Japanese market is its 
demand for high quality which most companies feel is good since their products are in 
the high quality range. The fact that Japan has a slow growth doesn’t seem to worry 
the companies as these rather focuses on the opportunities that lay ahead. Concerning 
the establishment process for Swedish companies that aim to enter the Japanese 
market in the future. It seems clear that attaining insidership through networks will be 
of increasing importance in the future as the world we live in becomes more and more 
integrated. Regarding management of Japanese subsidiaries in the future it seems as it 
will be even less complicated than it is now. This due to the fact that the Japanese are 
becoming increasingly better at English and the prejudice against foreign companies 
in Japan is slowly disappearing. All this will account for an easier business 
environment where it is easier for foreign companies to grow. 
6.2	  Limitations	  to	  the	  study	  
To develop this research it would have been good for us to include other companies 
than IKEA that have failed in the market. The lack of companies that had experienced 
this can be explained by the fact that most simply didn’t want to be interviewed; 
nonetheless this would have been a good edition to our thesis. The inclusion of 
companies that left the market would paint a clearer picture regarding the difficulties 
faced in Japan. Another addition would have been to include more B2C companies; in 
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this thesis the only B2C company is IKEA, which showed different results than the 
B2B companies. In this thesis IKEA stands alone for the result of B2C companies in 
Japan, which is a bit narrow. 
 
To conclude, the addition of companies that have failed in the market as well as more 
companies that work more closely with private consumers would probably have 
enhanced the thesis further. 
6.3	  Suggestions	  for	  future	  research	  
The Uppsala model (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) is outdated. The international 
environment has changed drastically over the past 35 years and as such the Uppsala 
model is not as applicable to business today as it has been in the past. As the authors 
themselves say in their 2009 article, regarding what has changed since the model was 
introduced: “Events move more quickly and assume somewhat different forms. 
Nonetheless, one constant in coping with uncertainty remains: firms need to learn, 
and to create or strengthen relationships in order to exploit opportunities.” (Johanson 
& Vahlne, 2009, p 1423.) 
 
Which leads us to the fact that we believe that what Johanson & Vahlne (2009) 
discuss can be applied to the reality of today’s business environment. Our study 
correlates well with their analysis that networks are of increasing importance for 
companies successful internationalization. That the process of acquiring insidership is 
instrumental for a company’s success is evident since the companies in this thesis 
have worked hard to attain it. As such, we believe that Johanson & Vahlne’s (2009) 
article should be taken into consideration when doing a similar study in the future. 
 
Regarding Hofstede's (1984)  cultural dimensions we can conclude that we can see a 
clear connection between the theory and the empirical data. Most of the problems that 
the companies have faced due to culture can be interpreted from looking at the 
differences between Japan and Sweden’s respective scores. The one big deviation is 
the fact that the companies had not experienced any problems due to the vastly 
different scores of Masculinity between the countries. It is also important to note that 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions can be deceptive since these does not affect every 
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aspect of management of a subsidiary as proved in this thesis regarding HR 
management. As long as there is an awareness of this Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
(1984) can serve as a great tool. Even if the cultural dimensions were originally 
developed in the 1980s the cultural dimensions framework as it is explained in 
Hofstede (2010) still is of value for international cross-cultural management.  
 
Regarding the EPRG model (Heenan & Perlmuter, 1979) we feel that this model 
provides a good view of different strategies to utilize when managing a subsidiary. 
Through this model it is in an efficient way possible to describe and categorize what 
strategy the companies are using. The pros and cons of the different strategies quickly 
become clear. This model is recommended for use in future research as it efficiently 
provides the reader with a good understanding of the subject. 
6.4	  The	  contribution	  of	  our	  thesis	  
In this thesis we shed light upon the different ways that six Swedish companies have 
handled their establishment and management of their Japanese subsidiaries. The 
findings show that the Japanese market has a high potential for attracting more 
Swedish companies in the future. Overall, it has been noted in our interviews that 
Sweden has a good reputation in Japan and the companies that have already entered 
have made the way for new Swedish companies to enter the market. It is also clear 
that the market is becoming increasingly accepting of foreign companies. As more 
and more successful Swedish companies are becoming well known in the country the 
Japanese people realize that Swedish companies can be trusted. The size of the 
Japanese market and the need that exists in Japan for an economic upturn gives strong 
incentives for more Swedish companies to enter the market. 
 
It is clear that a company that aims to enter the Japanese market need to put time and 
effort into understanding the market prior to entry. The importance of relationships 
when conducting business in Japan is instrumental. For industry it is important to note 
that achieving insidership helps with everything from buying real estate to hiring 
qualified personnel.  
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Regarding the differences in management between Sweden and Japan it is clear from 
our findings that the discrepancies between the two are not as vast as the theories and 
previous literature suggests. The companies in our thesis utilize management methods 
that are quite similar to the ones that are used in Sweden. As long as a company takes 
into consideration that there are some modifications needed, no major differences can 
be seen.   
 
We believe that our conducted research and found conclusions can contribute to a 
stronger understanding of the market and the opportunities and difficulties that it is 
associated with it. We believe that this research concerning Japan is indeed of 
practical importance for the industry since it provides the reader with a stronger 
knowledge base when conducting research prior to a potential entry on the market. 
This knowledge will be of great importance since we believe that the amount of 
Swedish companies that are present in Japan will continue to increase in the future. 
We hope these companies find this thesis helpful to the degree that they won’t get 
Lost in Translation! 
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Questionnaire 
Here	  we	  present	  the	  Questionnaire	  that	  we	  sent	  out	  to	  those	  answering	  by	  mail.	  We	  
also	  based	  our	  interviews	  on	  this	  Questionnaire.	  
	  
	  Do	  you	  or	  your	  company	  wish	  to	  be	  anonymous?	  	  
Company background Please	  provide	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	  your	  company’s	  activities	  in	  Japan	  and	  overall.	  	  	  What	  is	  your	  role	  in	  the	  company	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  activities	  in	  Japan?	  	  	  
Establishment	  Why	  did	  the	  company	  enter	  the	  Japanese	  market?	  	  	  How	   did	   the	   company	   enter	   the	   market?	   Greenfield,	   Joint	   Venture,	   Exports,	  acquisition?	  	  	  Did	  you	  have	  any	  collaboration	  with	  Japanese	  firms	  /	  the	  Japanese	  market	  before	  entering	  on	  your	  own?	  	  	  Were	  you	  involved	  during	  the	  establishment	  process	  in	  Japan?	  	  	  What	  main	   difficulties	   and	   possibilities	   did	   your	   company	   face	   when	   entering	  Japan?	  	  	  Were	  these	  difficulties	  and	  possibilities	  expected?	  And	  if	  so	  did	  you	  do	  research	  about	  the	  potential	  difficulties	  and	  possibilities?	  	  	  How	  long	  did	  the	  establishment	  process	  take?	  	  	  Did	  the	  bureaucracy	  pose	  any	  problems	  for	  you?	  	  	  Was	  it	  difficult	  to	  recruit	  talented	  people?	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How	   did	   Japan’s	   laws	   and	   regulations	   affect	   the	   establishment	   process?	   Have	  these	  been	  helpful	  or	  problematic?	  	  Have	  you	  seen	  any	  change	  in	  the	  establishing	  climate	  of	  Japan	  since	  you	  entered?	  
	  Has	   being	   a	   Swedish	   company	   been	   an	   advantage	   or	   disadvantage?	   Please	  provide	  details.	  	  	  
Management	  	  How	  much	  influence	  does	  the	  HQ	  have	  over	  the	  activities	  conducted	  in	  Japan?	  	  	  How	  many	  Swedish	  people	  are	  employed	  at	  your	   Japanese	  subsidiary	  and	  how	  much	  influence	  do	  they	  have	  regarding	  management?	  	  	  Is	  there	  high	  career	  mobility	  within	  your	  company	  which	  allows	  people	  to	  move	  to	  different	  subsidiaries,	  or	  do	  you	  work	  more	  with	  stationed	  positions?	  	  	  What’s	   the	   difference	   in	  management	   between	   Sweden	   and	   Japan	  within	   your	  company?	  	  	  What	  difficulties	  have	  you	  faced	  due	  to	  cultural	  differences?	  	  	  Is	   it	   difficult	   for	   the	   company	   to	   attract	   young	   talent?	   Is	   your	   company	  considered	  to	  be	  an	  attractive	  employer	  in	  Japan?	  Why?	  Why	  not?	  	  	  What	  problems	  does	  the	  language	  barrier	  pose	  for	  your	  company	  in	  Japan?	  	  	  How	  has	  the	  management	  of	  your	  Japanese	  subsidiary	  changed	  during	  your	  time	  in	  Japan?	  	  	  
CSR	  	  Does	  the	  company	  actively	  work	  with	  CSR	  in	  Japan?	  If	  so,	  what	  kind	  of	  activities	  are	  you	  involved	  in?	  	  	  How	  do	  the	  CSR	  activities	  differ	  from	  Sweden	  and	  other	  countries	  where	  you	  are	  active?	  Why?	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How	   did	   you	   handle	   the	   Tohoku	   earthquake	   and	   tsunami	   catastrophe/the	  ongoing	  disaster	  at	  Fukushima	  Nuclear	  Power	  Plant?	  	  	  Please	   compare	   your	   actions	   with	   other	   foreign	   companies	   in	   Japan,	   with	  Japanese	  companies?	  	  	  How	  did	  the	  earthquake	  affect	  the	  company	  overall	   in	  business,	  operations	  and	  management	  in	  Japan?	  Where	  there	  any	  long-­‐lasting	  effect?	  
	  
	  
Japanese	  market	  	  Does	  the	  demand	  in	  the	  Japanese	  market	  differ	  from	  other	  markets?	  If	  so,	  how?	  	  	  What	  are	  the	  positive	  and	  negative	  aspects	  of	  the	  Japanese	  market?	  	  	  Have	  you	  had	  to	  adapt	  your	  products	  in	  some	  way	  to	  the	  Japanese	  market?	  If	  so,	  why	  and	  how?	  	  	  Due	   to	   the	   cultural	   differences	   have	   you	   had	   to	   change	   your	   way	   of	  communicating	  with	  the	  market?	  	  	  
Future	  prospects	  Are	  you	  presently	  doing	  anything	  specific	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  future?	  	  	  What	  changes	  are	  you	  seeing	  in	  the	  economic	  climate	  of	  Japan?	  	  	  Does	   the	   emergence	   of	   China	   as	   an	   economic	   superpower	   pose	   a	   threat	   or	   an	  opportunity	  for	  your	  Japanese	  operations?	  	  	  How	  did	  the	  earthquake	  change	  your	  prospects	  for	  the	  future?	  	  	  Is	  the	  competition	  in	  your	  sector	  becoming	  harder	  or	  easier?	  Why?	  	  	  	  Would	  it	  be	  all	  right	  if	  we	  contacted	  you	  again	  for	  potential	  follow	  up	  questions?	  
	  
 
 
